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Very little has been written about the Canadian Army Film Unit (CAFU) since the end of 
the Second World War, despite Jon Farrell’s 
postulation. There have been a few short 
newspaper articles related to the Film Unit and 
the D-Day footage that made it famous, but there 
has been no scholarly study by either military 
or film historians.2  The purpose of the CAFU 
was to create an official 
audio-visual record 
o f  C a n a d a ’ s 
Army, just as 
t h e  o f f i c i a l 
historians, war 
ar t is ts ,  and 
photographers 
were documenting 
other aspects of 
the war.3  The Film 
Unit started as only a 
few men, but expanded s u b s t a n t i a l l y 
throughout the war, increasing the scope and 
breadth of its productions. The men and women 
of the CAFU who operated the cameras, edited 
the film, and then distributed the finished 
products were different from the civilian war 
correspondents and commercial newsreel 
cameramen who were also creating a visual 
record of the war. The CAFU attached cameramen 
to military units and they shot real-time footage 
of Canadians in battle. This footage was then 
used to create the CAFU films, and formed the 
basis of National Film Board of Canada (NFB) 
and commercial newsreel company productions. 
Most of the existing scholarship exploring 
Canadian film and the Second World War focuses 
on the NFB and John Grierson, the father of the 
documentary in Canada and the NFB’s first film 
commissioner.4  The historiography suggests 
that the NFB was, for all practical purposes, the 
main film institution creating Canadian motion 
pictures. This was true, but much of its wartime 
film footage came from 
the cameras of the 
CAFU – footage 
that was shot 
in harm’s way. 
Despi te  th is 
n e g l e c t  b y 
historians, the 
C A F U  p l a y e d 
an essential role 
in the history of 
Canadian film. Much 
of what subsequent generations have seen or 
know about the Second World War comes from 
footage shot by the Film Unit. Yet it is a difficult 
story to tell since it must be pieced together 
using primary sources, both textual and audio-
visual. The Film Unit will receive the credit that 
it deserves and will find its place again in the 
history of the Second World War.
* * * * *
There was no official mandate for securing Canadian wartime moving images at the 
start of the war, but the Public Relations Office, 
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“The exploits and adventures of these tripod toters, both in and out of actual combat, 
will no doubt enliven the pages of more than one book which will be written some 
day about World War II.”1        Jon Farrell, Canadian Geographic Journal, June 1945
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formed in 1940 and commanded by Captain 
W.G. Abel, obtained or assisted in the recording 
of several films relating to the Canadian forces’ 
activities in the United Kingdom since their 
arrival in December 1939.5  The movies were shot 
by commercial companies, an improvised film 
unit made up of soldiers from the Photographic 
Section of the Canadian Corps (later Army) 
Headquarters, and British commercial companies 
commissioned by the NFB.6  But these groups 
worked on an ad hoc basis, and so there were 
enormous gaps in the coverage. Furthermore, 
they were generally uninterested in most military 
issues like training and day-to-day activities. As 
a result, the motion pictures they produced were 
a patch-work of images, driven by the demands 
of entertainment and publicity, and a poor visual 
historical record. 
 Accordingly, in January 1941, Lieutenant-
General Andrew McNaughton, who commanded 
the Canadian Corps in the United Kingdom, asked 
Major C.P. Stacey, the newly-appointed historical 
officer, to report on the value of establishing a 
permanent film unit. Stacey recommended the 
organisation of a unit of soldier-cameramen 
within Public Relations, which would eliminate 
the reliance on commercial companies and 
ensure “an admirable collection of historical 
films dealing with Canadian military activity 
in this country.”7  While the earlier commercial 
films focused on publicity and entertainment, 
Stacey, perhaps not surprisingly, thought the 
value of moving images was rooted in their use 
as an historical record. McNaughton agreed, and 
it was decided that an army film unit would be 
established. Unfortunately, nothing was done for 
over half a year.
 That changed in August 1941 when John 
Grierson was quoted in various newspapers that 
he was going to run a film unit for the Canadian 
Army.8  Grierson had been adept at expanding 
his role in the Canadian film industry before the 
war, and he clearly had his eyes set on the war 
overseas. While the National Film Board Act 
(1939) specified that no government department 
could produce films without the authority of 
the NFB, this was difficult to enforce overseas 
and completely ignored by McNaughton. When 
Grierson arrived in London that same month, 
he met with senior Canadian officers, where 
he argued for control over all film work. In one 
heated discussion with Lieutenant-General Price 
Montague at Canadian Military Headquarters 
(CMHQ) in London, Grierson went so far as to 
claim that only he, as Film Commissioner, could 
approve and direct film activities. Montague did 
not take kindly to the idea of a civilian interfering 
with the army and Grierson’s claims were 
disregarded.9  
 This was the impetus needed at CMHQ to 
establish the film unit, which had been forgotten 
in the activity of training and expansion. The 
Canadian Army Film Unit was officially formed in 
October 1941 to ensure “accurate presentation of 
Canada’s war effort.”10  It was to record subjects 
suitable for theatrical release in Canada, produce 
training films, and document the activities of the 
Canadian Army.11  It operated under the Public 
Relations Office at CMHQ and, at first, comprised 
just two officers and two other ranks.12 They 
began to film the overseas units, but were plagued 
by faulty equipment and lack of supplies. 
 A disappointed Grierson returned to 
Canada, later acknowledging the authority of 
the army to film its own activities.13  However, 
Grierson’s well-earned reputation as a master 
director ensured that some of his suggestions 
for personnel were accepted. George Noble, a 
British cameraman with whom Grierson was 
familiar, and Michael Spencer, a former NFB 
employee, were recommended, becoming two of 
the founding members of the CAFU.14  Despite 
this seemingly supportive relationship, Grierson 
continued to look for ways to wrestle control away 
from the Film Unit.
* * * * *
Lieutenant Jack McDougall, a former cameraman and director for the Associated 
Screen News (ASN), commanded the CAFU. The 
ASN, a Canadian film company, would contribute 
several additional experienced personnel 
to the CAFU. Assisting McDougall were the 
aforementioned Noble and Spencer, as well as 
Al Grayston, also a former ASN employee.15  All 
had cinematographic experience in Canada or 
the United Kingdom and were eager to put their 
skills to use.
 The men of the film unit underwent training 
in refresher cinematography courses through 
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British film schools, but they were also instructed 
in regular infantry battle drill.16  Although the 
formal film training was useful, nothing could 
supplement the shooting experience received 
in the field. Before this trial-by-fire, however, 
the CAFU practiced its art by covering parades, 
training and manoeuvres.17 
 The soldier-cameramen produced films 
almost immediately, and within a month of the 
CAFU’s establishment  it had fulfilled a number 
of NFB requests for footage. It also developed a 
plan of future projects.18  Yet the overseas forces, 
with the exception of two battalions sent to Hong 
Kong in 1941 and a few other garrison units, were 
training in England and defending the United 
Kingdom against possible German invasion. The 
only topics available to the CAFU were training, 
non-combat roles, and social activities. And so 
these themes were prevalent in early productions. 
 In an effort to support operational activities 
in the army, by early 1942, training films were 
being produced. The CAFU developed scripts in 
conjunction with training schools, and was then 
responsible for securing the required shots.19  
Like standardized training manuals, film allowed 
the army to ensure that all troops received a 
consistent message. Army instructors believed in 
the effectiveness of training new recruits through 
the replication of battle situations. The CAFU 
was asked to shoot mock-battles, but later in 
the war some scenes in the training films were 
taken from footage of actual battle sequences.20  
The main purpose of these motion pictures was 
to instruct, and Smoke of Battle (1944), for 
instance, was used as a refresher course and to 
show experienced troops how to effectively use 
smoke screens in combat.21  
 By enlisting the CAFU to produce these 
movies, instead of a civilian company, the army 
was able to secure footage that was top secret.22  
In the short film, Ronson Flame Thrower (1942), 
animated diagrams were used to describe the 
physics behind the flame thrower and how it was 
built.23  There were also close-ups of different 
parts of the equipment and live-action shots of 
soldiers using flame throwers in mock battles. 
Due to the secret nature of the subject matter, it 
would have been risky for a civilian organisation 
to produce the film. Already, the military-
controlled CAFU was proving its value. 
 The CAFU’s theatrical films also had great 
value for the Canadian Army. Through the 
production of more than a dozen twenty-minute 
motion pictures, the Public Relations Office was 
able to propagate a positive view of the army to 
both military and civilian audiences in Canada 
and abroad.24  The films were scripted and 
sometimes comprised staged footage, paralleling 
closely the modern-day documentary. They 
received a warm reception internationally.
 Wood for War (1941), the first CAFU 
theatrical short, documented the work of the 
Canadian Forestry Corps in Scotland and 
detailed the camaraderie shared between 
Canadian lumberjacks and local Scots.25  The 
production of Wood for War was followed by 
Motorcycle Training (1942).26  This movie 
highlighted the impact of the motorcycle on 
the effectiveness of the army through a series 
of dramatized sequences, where a dispatch 
rider rushed to deliver an important message. 
The films, distributed in the British Ministry of 
Information weekly series, were both immensely 
popular and later dubbed into several foreign 
languages. 27  However, international success did 
not ensure distribution in Canada. In fact, Wood 
for War and Motorcycle Training were never 
shown to Canadian audiences. Although the films 
were quality productions, the NFB, which was 
responsible for the Canadian distribution of the 
CAFU films, did not think that the subjects had 
a broad enough appeal. The NFB commended 
Wood for War but it also claimed it was unable 
to support this film as it did not fit with its “own 
plan of theatrical distribution.”28  This was just 
John Grierson, Film Commissioner,
National Film Board of Canada.
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the beginning of the difficulties between the CAFU 
and the NFB, and it set the stage for the “war of 
wills” that was to play out over the coming years. 
 Although the NFB and the soldier-cameramen 
were intended to work cooperatively with the 
former advising the CAFU on the type of material 
to be shot, the first correspondence received from 
the NFB did not arrive in London until May 1942 
– eight months after the Film Unit was formed. 
The relationship between the two organizations 
had been strained since Grierson’s failed attempt 
to gain control over the Film Unit in August 1941. 
The poor relationship was a cause of concern for 
many in the army, and Major W.G. Abel of the 
Public Relations Office was particularly worried 
that an unhelpful NFB would be detrimental 
to the army’s public image; he tried to find 
a compromise: “Lieutenant McDougall is, of 
course, familiar with the stuff that you have 
required in the past,” Abel wrote to Grierson in 
May 1942. “It appears that he is shooting with 
that in mind, but precisely the same information 
led him to produce ‘Wood for War.’ It would be 
a great pity if the material that has been going 
forward has not been suitable, and that through 
lack of advice corrections were not made.”29  
Abel’s intervention did little to ease the tension, 
and there were few additional attempts by the 
NFB to assist the CAFU in its film-making. But 
the NFB’s unwillingness to support the CAFU was 
a blessing in disguise, forcing the overseas unit 
to develop its own in-house expertise, including 
the coordination and distribution of its own 
productions to commercial newsreel companies. 
* * * * *
In the spring of 1942, the 2nd Canadian Division began training for a raid on Dieppe, 
France. Although members of the CAFU were 
initially requested to film the action, they were 
later denied the opportunity just days before 
the operation. Instead, three British cameramen 
accompanied the Dieppe expedition and, 
consequently, there was no CAFU-produced 
film footage of the raid. This was the first 
major action by Canadian troops in England in 
nearly two years and it was very upsetting to the 
soldier-cameramen that they were not allowed to 
participate. Aware of the raid’s importance, the 
NFB soon requested all of the CAFU’s footage. 
The CAFU was in the humiliating position of 
having to ask the British War Office for copies of 
the film shot by their cameramen. 
 McDougall was furious that his men had been 
denied the opportunity to film the Canadians. 
“Where the fault lies I have no way of knowing, 
but the fact remains that we had a definite job to 
The Smoke of Battle film in the making. A film crew looks on as a house is set on fire, Sussex, England, 8 August 1944.
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do, we were trained, prepared and equipped to 
do it, and when the time came to do it we were 
deliberately ignored,” wrote McDougall.30  He 
asked CMHQ to examine this issue and develop 
a policy for operational film coverage. McDougall 
also presented an ultimatum: if CMHQ was not 
satisfied with the current quality of work then he 
would ask to be replaced and transferred back to 
combat duties. McDougall’s threat was successful 
and he received full support and backing from 
both the Public Relations Office and CMHQ in late 
August 1942.31  A policy for operational coverage 
was soon established.
 At the same time, the Dieppe debacle set 
off another power struggle between the NFB 
and CMHQ for control over the Film Unit. The 
footage of the Dieppe raid, accused Grierson, 
“was especially poor, lacking not only in the 
imaginative approach but also in quality.” 
Grierson twisted the dagger, patronizingly 
reminding CMHQ that the NFB and the Canadian 
public were accustomed to films of a certain class 
and “it must, above all, be newsworthy and of 
a quality which will enable our various needs 
in recruiting, public relations and morale to be 
adequately served.” 32  
 It is difficult to reconstruct precisely the 
Dieppe footage that the NFB received, but it is 
clear that no cameramen hit the beaches and 
so all shots would have been from ships several 
kilometres away, thus failing to convey the 
immediacy of combat.33  There were scenes of 
the air battle, but the majority of this footage was 
taken from a distance, and the air craft appear 
as little more than dark specks in the sky. The 
best footage was shot from planes looking down 
on the battlefield, but there was precious few 
shots to enliven the long distance footage from 
the ships. It is not surprising that when the CAFU 
produced its retrospectives on the Dieppe raid 
later in the war that the majority of the footage 
was German.34  
 Grierson hoped to use the failed opportunity 
at Dieppe to gain control over the CAFU, arguing 
in September 1942 that CMHQ should be 
responsible only for the policy of the Film Unit, 
and that “the National Film Board, should be 
given the opportunity to exercise [its] proper 
responsibility as its executors.”35  Yet since the 
CAFU was not the source of this footage, it was 
difficult for Grierson to use this botched coverage 
as a reason for control. More importantly, after 
running the Film Unit for a year, the army was 
not about to hand over the job of documenting 
its war to a civilian agency. Abel and McDougall 
rallied to the defence, and the NFB’s request for 
control was denied; in fact, more personnel were 
attached to the Film Unit. This influx of additional 
resources enabled the CAFU to produce the 
Canadian Army Newsreel, its most popular and 
widely viewed film product.
 The first Canadian Army Newsreel was 
released on 16 November 1942, with all 
subsequent productions available on the fifteenth 
of every month. The Newsreel contained between 
five to ten stories an issue and was composed of 
CAFU footage. The newreels were approximately 
ten minutes in length with sound and narration, 
featuring stories, initially, on sporting events, 
inspections, parades, commemoration, training, 
and non-combat duties.36  Once the Canadian 
Army was involved in active battle, however, the 
Newsreel also included combat footage. 
 These short movies were a source of 
entertainment and information for the soldiers. 
“The Canadian Army Newsreel has a good 
reputation with the troops for unbiased and 
unpropagandized news,” testified one report.37  At 
the time, the men of CAFU did not consider their 
work on the Newsreel as propaganda, as their 
primary role was to document the army. But since 
the films were edited and scripted, there would 
certainly be a bias – the Allies were trying to win 
a war and would do whatever they needed to win, 
including building the morale of the soldiers by 
carefully edited footage.38  For example, in the 
earliest Newsreel production on the Dieppe 
raid, Dieppe Heroes Honoured (1942), the CAFU 
focused primarily on the commemoration of 
the raid.39  The story recorded Dieppe veterans 
receiving awards at Buckingham Palace and there 
was little mention as to what happened during 
the raid or of those who never returned. From 
this newsreel alone, one might imagine it was a 
victorious operation.
 The newsreels were distributed through 
the Auxiliary Services as part of the regular 
recreational program.40  “Each issue has been 
very warmly greeted by the troops,” noted 
McDougall, they “seem to want as much of this 
sort of thing as we can give them.”41  Initially, 
it was only possible to show the newsreel to 
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soldiers stationed in Britain, but, by the end of 
1943, the Auxiliary Services requested that the 
Newsreel be presented wherever the Canadian 
Army was posted or fighting.42  The Newsreel was 
also available to soldiers in Canada through the 
Public Relations Office.
 In early 1943, a special War Establishment was 
approved to increase the number of cameramen 
in order to more fully cover future operations. 43  
This expansion created a small editing team and 
a field unit for operational coverage. The No. 1 
Film Unit was composed of three cameramen, 
one officer and two other ranks. It was attached 
to Divisional Headquarters, but it would travel 
between brigades or battalions, shooting the 
army’s activities.
 The officer of the Film Unit was the primary 
point of contact for the brigade and it was 
essential for him to be kept abreast of any action. 
“They should not be regarded as interfering 
“press” representatives, but as front line soldiers, 
performing a very necessary military duty,” 
opined one optimistic report.44  And this was 
generally the case, as most soldiers supported the 
CAFU’s activities. The cameramen were attached 
to various operational units to document their 
actions and usually attended briefing sessions 
for upcoming engagements. Forewarned of the 
next operation, the men of the CAFU took their 
position near the front and waited for the battle 
to begin. They were well within range of sniper, 
artillery, and mortar fire.45  The cameramen 
spent most of their time preparing for the 
battle, realizing that they would have very little 
opportunity to capture the actual chaos of war 
on film.46
 The CAFU’s first entry into battle occurred 
at Sicily when the No. 1 Film Unit landed with 
the first assault wave on 10 July 1943.47  The 
landings were lightly contested, and Sergeant 
Alan Grayston filmed the early morning activities, 
getting some of the best footage, including shots 
of Canadians charging up the beaches and 
breaking down wire barricades. Lieutenant Al 
Fraser also filmed the landing, focusing on a 
group of “knocked out guns,” before moving 
on to a captured airfield to record prisoners.48  
The 1st Division, with the Film Unit following, 
pushed the enemy back in what became a hot, 
dusty, and nasty campaign. Almost immediately, 
Fraser arranged for the unit’s precious footage 
to be sent back to London for 
censorship and editing. The 
transfer of material was usually 
done by plane in order to ensure 
that the footage arrived within a 
day or two of being shot. 
 Each soldier-cameraman 
was supplied with a portable 
camera, usually the Bell and 
Howell Eyemo, a lightweight 
metal tripod, and 900 to 3,000 
feet of film (thirty to ninety 
minutes) that was carried in 
pouches on the front and back 
much like soldiers carrying 
ammunition.49  They were also 
equipped with a pistol and a 
knife. The members of the Film 
Unit considered themselves as 
part of the fighting force and 
often volunteered to assist units 
in battle, including putting down 
cameras and picking up rifles.
Film Unit movie camera mounted on 
the turret of a Sherman tank,  23 May 
1944 in the vicinity of the Hitler Line, 
Italy.
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 The Film Unit did not create any theatrical 
films from the footage shot in Sicily, but a number 
of Newsreels carried their footage.50  While 
Canadian Army Newsreel No. 13 – Sicily (1943) 
presented the crossing and assault landing, the 
next issue focused on the Canadians’ battle for 
Leonforte and Agira. The film showed heavy 
combat with tanks advancing and the Canadians 
encountering German mortar fire outside of 
Leonforte. The battle was characterized by 
fierce street fighting, but the cameramen were 
unable to record the action. Instead, the editing 
team in London used other available footage, 
like the shots of Leonforte destroyed after the 
battle, to create the Newsreel story. 51  The film 
also documented the fight for Agira at the end of 
July 1943. Unfortunately, the operation began 
before daybreak, so the light was not ideal 
for a well-exposed shot. Although they were 
working in difficult conditions, to say nothing 
of filming under enemy fire, the cameramen 
were resourceful. For instance, as the artillery 
shells were fired from the Canadian guns, 
the muzzle flash lit the surrounding area and 
created a ghostly and powerful image of battle. 
The quality of the footage was improving and the 
Sicilian campaign was very successful for the 
Film Unit. Yet the Sicily battles also proved that 
a cameraman could not record everything, and 
even when in position it was difficult to get good 
shots due to light, fragile equipment, and enemy 
fire. 
* * * * *
While the Canadians were capturing unique footage on the battlefield, an administrative 
battle continued to rage over control of the CAFU. 
Although Grierson’s last attempt to envelop the 
Film Unit was unsuccessful, his complaints 
continued, as did his lack of cooperation in 
distributing the CAFU productions. The NFB 
charged that the Film Unit was full of amateurs, 
lacking the creative talents of NFB directors and 
cameramen. Yet nothing could be further from the 
truth. The majority of the CAFU personnel had 
prewar cinematographic experience, be it with 
the NFB, ASN, or other broadcasting agencies. 
This, coupled with their military training, 
made them a good fit for a unit that required 
its personnel to negotiate film techniques and 
artistic construction, as well as be accepted as 
equals by the troops who they were to accompany 
into battle. 
 In an attempt to bridge the perceived 
artistic gap between the NFB and the CAFU, 
the Public Relations Office again tried to find a 
compromise, suggesting that Gordon Sparling be 
attached to the CAFU to head up its production 
activities in London.52  Sparling was a veteran 
film-maker of the ASN and it was thought that 
an individual possessing his experience would 
assuage Grierson. When Grierson heard of the 
recommendation, he reacted poorly, attempting 
to block Sparling’s attachment to the CAFU under 
the pretence that the ASN could not afford to lose 
a man of such experience. Grierson, it seemed, 
was trying to starve the CAFU of experienced 
film-makers. “When I took leave of my employer 
at Associated Screen, he was most sceptical that 
‘the army unit was anything more than two men 
and a boy,’” wrote Sparling. “This was, I found, 
typical of the general impression in Canada.”53  
The CAFU had earned a strong reputation among 
senior officers at CMHQ and the fighting men 
in the field, but their work had not yet been 
recognized across the Atlantic.
* * * * *
John McDougall, now promoted to Captain, commanded the Film Unit in the field 
while Sparling took charge over the London 
headquarters. McDougall and three men set out 
for Italy in September 1943. The Film Unit faced 
difficulties prior to landing as a U-Boat sank the 
ship upon which they were travelling. No one 
from the CAFU was hurt, but McDougall risked 
his life to save the one camera that was aboard; 
its destruction would have resulted in a serious 
delay in documenting the Canadians in battle.
 The Film Unit was in Italy for four months 
before it was combined with the Photo Unit, 
forming the Canadian Film and Photo Unit 
(CFPU). While both the still and movie cameramen 
documented the Canadians in several battles, it 
was at Ortona in December 1943 where the 
unit solidified its reputation.54  Ortona was an 
important anchor along the German defensive 
line, and it would not be relinquished lightly. The 
enemy had fortified the town, bombing streets 
and demolishing buildings to force the Canadian 
infantry into open squares where they would be 
easy targets for snipers.55  To avoid these killing 
grounds, the Canadians pioneered “mouse-holing” 
tactics – attacking from building to building by 
blowing holes in adjoining walls, allowing them 
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to stay inside and avoid most of the snipers.56  
While this tactic protected soldiers, it added to 
the difficulty of filming combat. The cameramen 
were thus forced to make choices relating to 
subject matter, not based upon importance 
but more on proximity, safety, and sometimes 
courageous opportunity. But the cameramen 
were tenacious. Sergeant Jack Stollery was 
with the tanks of the Three Rivers Regiment as 
they made their way through the battle-ravaged 
streets. The tanks came under German fire and 
their advance was halted. “Stollery was unable 
to cover the action from where he was so he 
pushed ahead for another hundred yards with 
camera and tripod, and calmly photographed 
the little battle which developed,” recounted one 
after-battle report. His actions “so surprised the 
commander of the leading tank that he opened up 
the hatch of his tank and took a picture himself 
with his own camera.”57  Stollery was awarded the 
Military Medal and his citation read, in part: “His 
appearance with the forward troops in moments 
of great danger…was in no small way responsible 
for bolstering their morale.”58  
 The Ortona footage reflected the brutal 
nature of the fighting. Battle of Ortona (1943) 
included the first images of dead soldiers in 
the Newsreel and the first image of a Canadian 
soldier wounded in action, though his injury was 
not severe. Canadians were recorded sorting 
out the German dead and digging their graves, 
giving them “a decent burial.” The film then 
moved on to show the rows and rows of German 
dead lying on the ground and then cut to a shot 
of Canadians marching towards Ortona. The 
last image was of a close-up of a dead German 
soldier with a gruesome head wound, the 
narration identifying the body as “one of Hitler’s 
soldiers… with a picture of his Fuhrer beside 
him.”59  Notwithstanding the earlier difficulties of 
capturing combat on film, the CFPU coverage of 
the battle for Ortona resulted in superb footage. 
The intensity of the fighting could only have been 
captured by cameramen at the front. Although 
the newsreel’s message highlighted the German 
defeat, there was no denying – or hiding – the 
difficult battlefield conditions. 
 The Ortona material was well received by 
the commercial newsreel companies, and was 
shown throughout North America. “Unit deserves 
highest praise,” cabled Sparling.60  The men of the 
Film Unit even heard back from their families at 
home, who had seen the footage, and at least one 
cameraman’s parents wrote worriedly about their 
son’s safety as he filmed the sharp end of war.61
 From their experiences in Sicily and Italy, 
the soldiers of the CFPU knew that camera work 
was very different when trying to stay alive on the 
battlefield. McDougall recounted that “one of the 
miracles of the last six months is the fact that we 
haven’t had a casualty yet. Our lads have been 
right up with the most forward troops day after 
day,” and that “everyone has his own collection 
of near misses.”62  The CFPU did not remain this 
lucky: a still photographer was killed and two 
cameramen were wounded seriously in January 
1944.
 Attached to different operational units to 
ensure the fullest coverage, the cameramen 
were isolated from one another, and thus had a 
tremendous amount of independence to decide 
what to capture on film.63 Although they had 
freedom to shoot what they wished, there was 
always a question of self-censorship. No formal 
policy existed on filming sensitive subjects, 
such as showing dead Canadian soldiers, but 
according to oral testimonies and existing 
footage, very few of the cameramen recorded 
these grim events. Dead and maimed Canadians 
would have signalled a defeat or setback and 
were not fitting content for other soldiers or 
those on the home front.64  At the same time, to 
leave them out reduced the effectiveness of their 
film as a documentary tool. These two conflicting 
goals were not easy to negotiate, but in this case 
sensibilities overruled the desire to show all 
aspects of the war. 
 Although self-censorship occurred, the men 
of the Film Unit drew the line at representing 
fabricated scenes as factual accounts. Since the 
CFPU’s main function was to document Canadian 
activities, “uncompromising truthfulness was 
decided upon. Re-enactment could easily become 
the thin edge of the wedge whereby the historical 
and record value would be completely sacrificed 
to propaganda, and cheap heroics.”65  This meant 
that every day of shooting would not always result 
in useable footage. If the operational unit to which 
the cameramen were attached was not involved 
in any major battles, there might not be much to 
Opposite: Sergeant George A. Game, CAFU, filming on 
the outskirts of San Leonardo di Ortona, Italy, 10 December 
1944.
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see or capture on film. Conversely, sometimes the 
battles were not conducive to recording footage; 
the CFPU’s cameramen, at one point in Italy, were 
caught in three days of shelling with the Royal 22e 
Régiment, but due to these deadly conditions they 
were unable to record much useful footage. Al 
Fraser of the No. 1 Film Unit explained the unit’s 
difficulties: critics “seem to think that we can 
manufacture an Ortona every day of the week, you 
know this isn’t possible, and thank goodness [it] 
is not possible, if the pix [sic] from here have not 
seemed very news-worthy, it is due to the plain 
fact that there just isn’t any news at present.”66  Yet 
much of this unnewsworthy footage was essential 
for documenting the daily life of the Canadian 
Army and was used in the Newsreels. 
 Despite the success of the CFPU, the 
relationship between it and the NFB continued 
to worsen, with Grierson making a final attempt 
to gain control in March 1944. Grierson was 
anxious to improve the overall quality of the 
9
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CFPU films and, in his new role as head of 
the Wartime Information Board, he mobilized 
his resources and contacts with the media. 
“Whenever Grierson invades this country there 
is always some advance notice of his coming,” 
remarked Abel.67  Grierson never made it to 
London, but the intent of his visit was mentioned 
in the May 1944 issue of Maclean’s magazine. 
Grierson, it was reported, had planned the trip 
because of his dissatisfaction with the CFPU 
footage: “lately the Army photographers have 
been sending back too few battle pictures, too 
many studies of Brass Hats.”68  By denigrating 
the reputation of the CFPU, it appeared that 
Grierson was hoping to again manoeuvre for 
control. Sparling was understandably furious, 
“it makes surprising reading for the rest of the 
army who are thus informed that CFPU personnel 
are only ‘uniformed photographers’ (similar to 
civilian war correspondents) rather than soldiers 
assigned to special duties.” 69  The good work of 
the CFPU, which had continued to support the 
army with training films and publicity material, 
allowed Abel to appeal to his superiors: 
A continuous check over a period of years 
indicates that we have had a lack of support 
which some of our very excellent films have not 
deserved, and it would seem strange to us now 
that having failed so far to obtain cooperation, 
the very organisation on whom we had relied, 
should be given direction and disposition of our 
future material.70
 The ongoing lack of NFB support was 
enough to thwart Grierson’s take-over bid, 
but control over Canadian film productions 
was also changing in preparation for the 
invasion of Northwest Europe. The Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force 
(SHAEF) was now responsible for, among other 
things, the coordination of all publicity services 
in Europe, including film and photography.71  It 
would have been nearly impossible to integrate a 
civilian body like the NFB into this multi-national 
military structure, especially with Canada as 
a junior partner. The Public Relations Office 
felt that the new arrangement through SHAEF 
would only improve the distribution of the 
CFPU’s military films, with Abel concluding that 
“we will probably get into the Canadian theatre 
much more frequently than we ever did through 
the cooperation of the Film Board.”72  As well, 
with SHAEF taking the lead on distribution, 
Canadian footage would now be shown to a larger 
international audience. This was the last salvo in 
Film Unit recording an attack by the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division in Normandy, 8 August 1944.
Opposite: The Allied bombing of Cap Gris Nez being 
captured on film, 26 September 1944.
P
ho
to
 b
y 
D
on
al
d 
I. 
G
ra
nt
, L
ib
ra
ry
 a
nd
 A
rc
hi
ve
s 
C
an
ad
a 
PA
 1
33
14
4
P
ho
to
 b
y 
D
on
al
d 
I. 
G
ra
nt
, L
ib
ra
ry
 a
nd
 A
rc
hi
ve
s 
C
an
ad
a 
PA
 1
16
53
7
10
Canadian Military History, Vol. 14 [2005], Iss. 3, Art. 3
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol14/iss3/3
31
the Grierson’s battle for control of overseas film. 
Soon after these arrangements were made, the 
CFPU proved itself again as a professional force. 
* * * * *
In February 1944, John McDougall, with the No. 1 Film Unit in Italy, was called back to 
England to organize a second field unit for the 
forthcoming operations in Northwest Europe.73  
By June 1944, there were close to 200 people 
attached to the CFPU, with most responsible for 
the transfer, editing, and creation of the films 
at the London headquarters. 74  Although there 
had been some good footage from the Italian 
campaign, the professional reputation of the 
CFPU was solidified on 6 June 1944, as it was 
responsible for the first footage and stills of 
D-Day landings to reach the public anywhere in 
the Allied world. 
 The Canadians laid claim to having the first 
Allied cameraman on French soil. Sergeant Dave 
Reynolds of the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion 
jumped into France in the early hours of 6 June, 
but like so many of the paratroops his drop was 
scattered and he missed his landing point. More 
detrimental, his camera was lost, torn from his 
body during the descent. Although Reynolds was 
unable to record any footage, he joined up with 
a unit of British paratroops who were advancing 
on a group of enemy defended houses. Attesting 
to his combat training, he led a section into a 
house, clearing the building, killing three German 
soldiers.75  Cameramen were responsible for 
shooting the war on film and, when necessary, 
Axis soldiers. 
 At Juno Beach, Sergeant Bill Grant came 
ashore safely with Lieutenant Frank Duberville, a 
still photographer. They filmed the fierce fighting, 
watchful for any landing crafts that would be 
able to transport their motion pictures and stills 
back to London. Grant’s film of the landing was 
the first to arrive in London, beating all other 
footage by six hours. Of the 700 feet of film, 
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the censor passed 
400 feet, which was 
sent off immediately 
to the commercial 
newsreels. Grant’s 
powerful footage 
w as  sh o t  f r om 
the landing craft 
behind the soldiers 
and captured the 
m e n  h u d d l e d 
together, waiting to 
disembark.76  The 
ramp of the craft fell 
away to reveal dark, 
fortified houses on 
the French coast. 
The infantry then 
advanced into the 
water, making their 
way to the beach 
while under heavy 
enemy fire. This 
experience of battle 
was captured on 
film and remains some of the most poignant 
footage of the war. 77 
 Grant’s D-Day film was featured in all the 
British Empire newsreels. It was also the first 
footage to reach North America, beating the 
others by a day. Yet the Canadian D-Day film 
footage was praised not only because it was 
received first, but also because of its quality. Even 
after the American footage was distributed, the 
CFPU was still considered to have shot the best 
battle scenes. McDougall described the reception 
of this material in a SHAEF pre-screening 
theatre: 
The theatre was packed with a lot of senior 
American officers, the censors[,] and our own 
representatives. We sat through about three 
or four thousand feet of rather dull American 
stuff, having to do mainly with preparations and 
embarkation. Then came Grant’s stuff. And it 
was good. It was bloody good. All through the 
theatre you could hear people whispering to 
each other and muttering as good shot followed 
good shot. When it was all over there was much 
excitement and planning on how to get it to 
Washington the quickest possible way.78
 A similar reception was received in Canada 
and the United States. “Invasion Pictures Scoop 
by Canucks,” and 
other laudatory 
newspaper head-
l ines  served as 
great publicity for 
the CFPU and the 
Canadian Army.79
 At  the end of 
June 1944, John 
McDouga l l  and 
the  No.  2  Fi lm 
Uni t  arr ived in 
Normandy. Caen fell 
on 10 July and the 
next day McDougall 
and Grayston began 
work on You Can’t 
Kill a City (1944), a 
documentary based 
on the destruction 
and reconstruction 
of the city.80  This 
was the first Allied 
scripted motion 
picture recorded on 
a battlefield. As they shot the film, the Germans, 
who were just on the other side of the river, were 
firing mortar shells into the city. The film was 
released later that same year internationally 
by the British Ministry of Information and was 
translated into several languages. Even the NFB, 
which had not been in contact with the CFPU for 
months, distributed the film in Canada.81  The 
relationship improved between the CFPU and 
the NFB after the invasion of France, and likely 
because of the unit’s celebrated work on D-Day. 
Grierson even paid a visit to the Film Unit in the 
summer of 1944, later stating in a CBC radio 
show that the men of CFPU “are fine soldiers, 
and up there where any other man will go.”82  
He further credited the Film Unit by saying that 
“no one should think as they see the newsreels 
of Canada Carries On or World in Action, or 
listen to CBC news reports, or read the stories 
of the Canadian war correspondents, that any 
of it is done without danger and without great 
determination.”83  The relationship between the 
NFB and CFPU had indeed changed. 
 The Canadian Army continued to push back 
the German forces in the summer of 1944 and 
the CFPU was there to capture it on film. But 
Images from the film shot by
Sergeant Bill Grant on D-Day.
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it was difficult work, and the cameramen were 
often caught up in the fighting. The 5th Brigade’s 
19 July 1944 attack at Fleury-sur-Orne became 
disorganized when one of the advancing units, Le 
Regiment de Maisonneuve, failed to coordinate its 
attack with the supporting barrage.84  The Film 
Unit got mixed into this confusion and arrived in 
Fleury-sur-Orne with the advance troops. During 
the battle, a number of Germans surrendered 
to the cameramen. Within minutes, though, an 
artillery barrage hit their position and all, captors 
and captives alike, dove for cover. When the 
intense barrage was finished, the Film Unit was 
left with three prisoners, the rest had escaped 
or been killed.85  Having survived the attack at 
Fleury-sur-Orne, cameraman Jimmie Campbell 
was killed the next day, while recording the 
Canadians in action.86  “There was no question of 
him missing a good shot just because the Jerry 
fire was heavy,” reported a radio broadcast. “In 
fact, the heavier the fire, greater the action, the 
nearer he’d crawl with his camera.” 87 The two 
reels of film he shot were sent to London, and 
when developed, they included fierce combat 
footage.88 
 During the battle for the Scheldt Estuary 
(September to November 1944), Sergeant Lloyd 
Millon attached a camera to an assault craft in 
order to obtain moving images of the infantry 
as they raced into battle. The cameramen 
were improving their filming techniques but 
Millon did not live to see the results, as he was 
killed during the operation.89  The strain of war 
continually interfered with the ability of the 
combat cameramen to film Canadian actions. 
During the fierce fighting at the Leopold canal, the 
Film Unit was unable to provide comprehensive 
coverage, since again, a camera was damaged, 
and Sergeant George Cooper was forced to 
watch helplessly as the Canadians stormed the 
positions. Yet even if Cooper had a camera, the 
water-logged attritional fighting would have been 
difficult to shoot, since mobility was greatly 
This famous image of Major David Currie (holding pistol at left) at St. Lambert-sur-Dives was captured by still and 
motion picture cameras. It has been described by historian C.P. Stacey as the closest “we are ever likely to come to a 
photograph of a man winning the Victoria Cross.” The cameraman on the left is often cropped out of this photograph.
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reduced in the porridge-like conditions. Even 
when footage was captured, it still had to make it 
through the war zone to the London offices. After 
filming on the beach at Westkapelle, Sergeant Ken 
Dougan stored his equipment and footage in a 
landing craft overnight. The craft was sunk in the 
evening by artillery fire and his equipment and 
footage were lost. Such were the trials of filming 
the war. 
 The No. 1 Film Unit was ordered to Northwest 
Europe in early 1945 after a long and difficult 
tour of duty in the Italian theatre. Upon its 
arrival, the two field units were combined to 
provide better coverage of the Canadian Army.90  
The Film Unit focused primarily on the Canadian 
divisions that were operating in Northern Holland 
and Western Germany. The difficult battlefield 
conditions continued to plague the cameramen, 
and the censors restricted all images of flooded 
areas so that the Germans would not know the 
extent of the military difficulties. Yet still the Film 
Unit documented these campaigns, including 
the joyous liberation of civilians, and was even 
present for the final surrender of the German 
armies in early May 1945.91  Attesting to the 
danger of shooting the war from the front lines, 
the CFPU had a casualty rate of approximately 
ten percent.92  Only four of the original twelve 
sergeants were left in the Film Unit by war’s end: 
three cameramen had been killed and eighteen 
were wounded. The CFPU had truly filmed the 
sharp end of war. 93
* * * * *
The Canadian Army Film Unit was established in 1941 with four men, “one old Newman-
Sinclair camera and one Eyemo camera, one 
table, two chairs and an empty film tin used 
as an ashtray.”94  It evolved into a professional 
unit of close to 200 men and women, who were 
responsible for the popular Canadian Army 
Newsreel, internationally-distributed theatrical 
pieces, and poignant footage, including the 
incredible D-Day landing film. Although there 
were power struggles with the NFB over the overall 
film quality and alleged non-professionalism 
of its staff, the soldier-cameramen’s main 
responsibility was to create an audio-visual 
record of the Army’s activities in the Second 
World War. And in this they succeeded.
 Jon Farrell’s 1945 comment on the inclusion 
of the Film Unit in the histories of the Second 
World War seemed at the time to be a certainty. 
But for the cameramen who risked their lives to 
document the war for Canadians, there are but 
few and fleeting references in military history or 
film study historiography to their deeds. This 
is all the more surprising since the CFPU left 
such a strong visual and textual record of its 
experiences. The moving images captured by 
the men of the CFPU have persisted in the post-
war construction of memory through the use 
and re-use of this footage in countless modern 
documentaries. Despite this historical legacy, 
most historians who have explored Canadian film 
in the Second World War remain focused on the 
NFB, ignoring or wrongly assigning how wartime 
footage was shot and processed overseas. Yet 
perhaps more important than “enliven[ing] the 
pages of more than one book,” it is hoped that 
now, sixty years later, proper tribute has been 
given to the CFPU, and its long and difficult battle 
to document the Canadian Army in the Second 
World War. 
Sergeant Margaret King at work on an editing machine in 
the film library of the Canadian Army Film Unit, London, 
England, 19 December 1944.
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Film documented the  Canadian war effort in 
both the First and Second 
World Wars. Though many 
of these films and newsreels 
are hidden away in archives, 
they are increasingly being 
made available to a wider 
audience through the Internet. 
Researchers can find these 
films on three websites in 
particular: the National Film 
Board, Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation (CBC), and the 
Library and Archives Canada.
National Film Board of 
Canada
The National Film Board site 
<www.nfb.ca/ww1> showcases 
“Images of a Forgotten 
War - Films of the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force in the 
Great War.” Here, one can find 
upwards of 25 short films about 
the Canadian Expeditionary 
Force (CEF) ranging in length 
from only a couple of minutes to 
ten or twelve minutes. The films 
are divided into two sections: 
“Building a Force” and “War 
Time.” Under the “War Time” 
section are films about the 
battles for Arras and Vimy Ridge. 
There are also films relating to 
the Hundred Days campaign, 
including the battle of Amiens 
and the Drocourt-Quéant Line.  
Other films ranging from artillery 
to gas warfare, from wartime 
medicine to the forestry corps, 
offer a glimpse into the varied 
wartime experiences of the CEF. 
In addition to the films, one can 
find “Pieces of History,” a section 
that provides 1000-word essays 
by historians to support the film 
footage, including essays on 
medicine, the air war, and life 
in the trenches.  There is also 
the Italian campaigns. There 
are four newsreels relating 
to Ortona, including a seven-
minute film simply titled “Battle 
of Ortona.” There is also a film 
of the Seaforth Highlanders 
honouring their dead and 
one of General H.D.G. Crerar 
inspecting his soldiers after 
the Battle of Ortona. “Sicily 
Snapshots” includes footage 
of training drills and Canadian 
Engineers building roads. The 
“Battle of San Leonardo” offers 
a glimpse into the harsh fighting 
of the Canadians before Ortona.  
In addition to the newsreels 
found on the CBC website there 
are also a number of radio 
broadcasts from Sicily and Italy 
by CBC correspondent Matthew 
Halton.
Other Websites
Film footage of the Canadians 
landing at Normandy is also 
available to the general public. 
On the Shooters web page 
<http://www.jamesoregan.com/
Shooters/>, one can find the 
famous 17-second D-Day film of 
the Canadians landing on Juno 
Beach.  It remains one of the 
most poignant films ever shot of 
Canadians in battle.
 By providing authentic 
footage from both World 
Wars, these websites allow 
all Canadians to glimpse the 
experience of battle. The films 
on these websites are an 
essential tool in telling the story 
of the Canadian Army.
Brandey Barton is completing her 
Masters of Arts degree in History at 
Wilfrid Laurier University
Documentary War Film on the Web
a series of still photographs to 
further complement the audio-
visual record.
Library and Archives Canada
A silent newsreel, “Canadians 
Capture Vimy Ridge,” can 
be found on the Library and 
Archives Canada (LAC) 
web page “Canada and 
the First World War” (http://
www.collectionscanada.ca/
firstworldwar/index-e.html). Click 
on “We Were There” and then 
“Donald Fraser” to find the video.
 The LAC website also 
contains a virtual exhibition on 
the disastrous Dieppe Raid 
of August 1942. “Through a 
Lens: Dieppe in Photography & 
Film” (www.collectionscanada.
ca/dieppe/index-e.html), 
developed by Sarah Klotz, 
presents Canadian and German 
army newsreels. The German 
newsreels allow one to observe 
the raid’s grim aftermath. The 
first newsreel is narrated in 
German while the second, a 
propaganda piece aimed for 
occupied countries, is narrated 
in Dutch (with English subtitles). 
While the German newsreels 
are superior in quality, the 
Canadian newsreels on this site 
present some moving images 
from after the raid, including 
the presentation of awards to 
Canadian soldiers and a victory 
parade through Dieppe in 1944. 
Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation
On the CBC website <www.
cbc.ca/news/background/
ortona> one can find numerous 
newsreels about the battle for 
Ortona, as well as more general 
footage of the Sicilian and 
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